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This research would like to see that the traditional threats facing a country will affect its domestic consumption. This 
study is in  Indonesian case,  to see the impact of its strategic environment threat on the national consumption. Assuming 
the natural balance of power, the threat appear not only from military capabilities, but also the economic power of a 
country. Single equation set up to capture the influence of traditional threats to national consumption. The results showed 
that the level of threat gives negative impact on consumption. Thus, to maximize consumption, the level of threat needs 
to be eliminated to a minimum. 
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1. INTRODUNCTION 
Government will be able to carry out their duties if only the state 
or national conditions in a secure condition. In addition the security, 
the country must also produces social welfare, like  optimizing 
consumption. Therefore, security as a form of public service can not 
stand alone and apart from welfare. Security and welfare are the two 
things interrelated. Security concerns often be overcome through the 
efforts of economics, and fulfillment of welfare will be maximum 
due to security. 
One of security problems are the traditional threats from outside 
the country. Defense costs are needed as an activity that is important 
in getting the security, to eliminate threats. So far there are two 
arguments that develop policy of defense spending. It can give a 
negative or positive effect on the economy. All research are still 
giving conflicting results, and is still not known for certain whether 
military spending can  support or depress the economy. 
Benoit (1978)1 argues that spending on defense can support the 
growing demand, increased utilization of the capital cost, the use of 
resources with lower cost, higher rates of employment, and higher 
profits. Moreover, the main purpose of the defense budget is to 
provide security, which is simultaneously expected to have a positive 
influence on the economy that impact on welfare. 
Kennedy (2017)2 found, the increase in the national defense 
budget turns out to have no effect on economic growth and gives 
negative externalities to the private sector. But, non-defense 
government budgets provide positive externalities to the private 
sector. This indicates that the non-defense budgets are able to provide 
a multiplier effect on the economy, but the defense budget has no 
effect on the economic sectors directly. From another empirical 
study3, we found that the effect of increasing defense budget will led 
to crowding out effect of investment.  
So, the defense budget policies must give effect to the national 
economy. It is important considering the eficiency of defense budget. 
Thus in this study the effect of defense budget will be reviewed on 
the welfare, by looking at the correlation between the traditional 
threat and national income to consumption. The ability of national 
consumption determine the level of prosperity of a country. 
This study is a topic of defense in the field of economics 
(economic defense). The study was expected to catch the defense 
budget function in eliminating the threat, viewed scientifically 
through economics. Economic analysis of defense should be to put 
together a variety of methods of economics, both theoretically and 
empirically, that are used in defense issues and policies, as well as 
view the institutional aspects and characteristics of the defense 
sector. Thus it would be useful for security and defense policies that 
impact on the national economy and social welfare. (Sandler and 
Hartley, 1995)4. 
                                                                                                                                                       
2. THE TRADITIONAL THREATS 
In some social welfare analysis, optimal public consumption is a 
key indicator of the government's commitment to social welfare. 
Although it looks like the defense budget does not directly affect the 
economy and welfare, but there is an important impact for creates a 
sense of security.  
.Security and defense are intimately associated with the threat, 
especially against external threats, which is a topic of analysis in this 
study. In the traditional sense, the definition of security is closely 
linked to the military force. The special characteristic of traditional 
security threats is coming from outside the country, the actors that 
threaten is a country. So it requires heavy and modern weapons to 
deal with it.  
The connotation of defense is the ability of the state in the face 
of traditional threats,  which the state must protect its citizens against 
threats from other countries, especially from their strategic 
environment. The level of traditional threats faced by a country is 
different. There are countries that traditionally did physical conflict, 
there is aggressive, do the arms race, or felt no threat at all. 
Traditionally, external threat comes from the asymmetrical military 
power among countries. Nowadays the concept has evolved into a 
natural balance of power. Natural balance of power is the nation's 
ideals for peace in the world that still continue to be realized. Natural 
balance of power is defined as the responsible attitude of a country in 
enhancing the potential strength in proportion to the relative attention 
of  internationalization and global rights. The system built is 
expected to create a peaceful economic competition between 
countries. Within their own country does not happen the competition 
between dimensions, both economic and military. (Virmani, 2004)5. 
In forming models of threat, especially for conditions that 
suitable for Indonesia, is to treat this as a potential threat variables or 
latent. This threat is not just those associated with military power, 
but also of the strength of the economy that can be physically 
counted. Leboviq & Ishaq (1987)6 describes a suitable model for 
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analyzing these threats by looking at the relative military capability 
of a country to another country that weighted by the physical quality 
of the macro indicators of a country. Countries with good economy 
will certainly be able to buy better weapons, improve human 
resources and develop cutting-edge technology. 
The threat level proxy for relative military capabilities are vary 
between countries. In accordance with the concept of natural balance 
of power developed at this time, where the desired competition is a 
healthy competition in the economy, the asymmetrical balance of the 
militarization of a country is the potential threats faced by other 
countries. Military Global Index (GMI) can be used to look at this 
situation. GMI is an index measuring the strength capacity of 
weaponry or the level of militarization on the trend of an increase or 
decrease in a country. This index is published by Bonn International 
Centre for Conversion Germany (BICC, 2011)7. GMI is used as a 
military capability. In this study used to calculate the external threats 
from other countries. (Grebe, 2011)8 
The threat level has a very abstract concept, so we formed an 
index to make a proxy. Until now still very difficult to determine 
quantitatively the level of threat. Inspired by Leboviq & Ishaq 
(1987)6 which states that the fundamental threat comes from external 
basic security needs of a country, to translate the threat, we creat the 
need for security index or security need index (SNI). Potential threats 
or SNI country i is a function of the relative capability of his country. 
The index perception of potential threats to the security needs are 
reflected in its security needs index. SNI (security neds index) can be 
proxied by the way:  
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Where RC is relative capability of a country. RCi is a function of 
military capability (cap) relative to his opponent states (state j), geog 
is the distance between the capital of two states, (n-1) is the number 
of states in the strategic environment, and military capabilities is 
reflected in the magnitude of its Global Military Index (GMI). 
 
3. THE RELATIONSHIP OF TRADITIONAL 
THREATS AND NATIONAL CONSUMPTION 
In facing modern threats now, always be associated with a 
military force that is proportional to a country's economy. The level 
of a country militarization, which is too high and out of proportion 
with the ability of economies, perceived as a threat to countries in the 
vicinity. Instead strength in the economy with healthy competition, is 
expected as a national power. Who owns the defense along with the 
strong economy, was the one who could control the international 
relations in the strategic environment. 
Defense interact with the economy through state protection 
against threats, it is very costly. Of course, the huge costs should not 
be wasted and must have an effect on social welfare. For that, to be 
seen the defense budget could affect national welfare through 
optimal consumption. To view the transmission between the defense 
budget to consumption, is through a variable of threat that eliminated 
by increasing budget. With the sense of secure, economy can work 
optimally. If it increases, will create all economic actors work with 
insecurity and not comfortable, so give the effect on the amount of 
goods/services that can be consumed. 
In this study, we will be answered how the influence of 
traditional threats to national consumption. The frame of mind the 
relationship between traditional threats with the consumption of 
these, can be seen in figure 1 below: 
 
Fig 1.  Framework of The Relationship of Traditional Threats and 
National Income to Consumption  
Consumption model is built from the welfare model based on the 
modification of the standard neoclassical model developed by Ron 
Smith (1995)9. Welfare function is determined by the views of policy 
makers assuming rational way. Welfare objective function can be 
simply illustrated that the aggregate amount of welfare (W) is a 
function of security (S), and the output of civilian (C). Defense is a 
public good, and even though consumption is not a public good, but 
per capita consumption is of particular interest to see the level of 
social welfare. Thus, in a simple welfare function can be written as 
follows:     W = W (S,C)                                                          (2)        
Security can not be treated as an objective scale, but subjectively, 
based on the perception of freedom from the threat of attack. 
Security is manufactured from military spending depends on the 
level of the threat of strategic environment. Such as utility or 
welfare, security is economic data that is not observable and should 
be replaced with other data quantification. This security function is 
formed by simple functions, namely:      S = S (M, H)                (3)                     
Where M is the volume of military spending, and E is the threat 
level of the strategic environment. Finally, the total output is made 
up of civilian and military expenditures activity, which is an 
exogenous variable.  
Based on the assumption of a linear budget constraints, the 
budget constraint is simply expressed as:   
MpCpY mc                                                                            (4)                  
Where Y is aggregate demand, whereas pm and pc showing 
deflator price relative to earnings. 
The fundamental question for the model is the selection of 
budget constraints. Using view of Smith (1995)9, the form of the 
budget constraint functions are linear expenditure system, that shows 
the effects of military spending and consumption. Welfare objective 
function using constant elasticity of substitution form of welfare 
function. That is assuming the functions homotetik homogeneous by 
constant elasticity. Forms of welfare functions of the Stone-Geary is 
a monotonic transformation of a non-linear function Cobb Douglas. 
Cobb Douglas selected for output elasticity of substitution between 
civilian and security, because it is easier to interpret and for some 
specific purposes. Thus, the formal models used are a form of Cobb-
Douglas   1.SCW , that monotonic transformed into: 
)log()1()log( SCW                                                         (5) 
To illustrate the security, we assumed the state is not aggressive 
but prepare to face threatening neighbor on the strategic environment 
(H), then security is the difference between military spending real, 
M, and the minimal military budget, M*. Minimal military budget is 
assumed as a linear equation where the intercept is a strategic 
military reserve. The slope is military budgets effectiveness facing 
threat of  the strategic environment. Security equation can be formed 
as follows:  
).(* 10 HMMMS                                                          (6)  
M* shows, partly a fixed element (
0 ) that has nothing to do 
with the strength of the opponent, but it is a military reserve to face 
opponents attack. The other part is as the effectiveness of military 
spending in the face of the threat. The variable of M and M* are what 
plays a role in maintaining optimal security.  
Thus, the formal shape of the whole model can be written as 
follows:  
Max                  )log()1()log( SCW                      
subject to         MpCpY mc ..   
                         ).(* 10 HMMMS                               (7)  
By using the objective function and constraints as above, the 
Lagrangean function becomes:   
)(*)log()1()log( MpCpYMMCL mc                         (8)                     
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By combining the equation, it becomes:        
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which is used to eliminate lagrange multiplier,. Now, we can 
provide welfare optimize consumption equation, namely:                      
)].([* 10 HpY
p
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Or, we can be modify by:             
tattt
sniagdpraaconsr  *)3(*)2()1(*                                    (15)            
Where consrt * is the optimal real domestic consumption in 
period t, gdprt is real gross domestic income in period t, and snit  is 
the level of traditional  threats in period t.  
 
4. DATAS 
Indonesia dealing with countries on the border, so it needs to be 
calculated relative to the capabilities of the countries in the strategic 
environment. Global Military Index (GMI) can be proxied as 
capability index relative who owned a country.  
Based on the method of calculation of the relative capabilities of 
Leboviq & Isaac (1987)6, established an index of relative capability 
of each country bordering Indonesia. From the relative capabilities of 
the index formed a State or security threats need index (SNI). 
Security need index for Indonesia can be seen in figure 2 below:  
 
 
Fig 2. Threats (SNI) that Faced by Indonesia. Source: Data 
Processing 
 
This study will be answered how the influence of traditional 
threats to the national consumption. The data is used to analyze the 
time series in the period of year 1990 until 2010. The movement of 
the data, consumption and gross domestic product (GDP), can be 
seen respectively in the figure 3 below: 
 
 
 
 
Fig 3.  Number of Consumption (Konsumsi) and Real GDP (PDB 
Riil).  Source: Data Processing. 
 
5. RESULTS 
Based on the variables data of traditional threats (SNI) and the 
level of national income (Real GDP), is analyzed if they influence 
the national consumption. Regression analysis was performed on a 
single model that has been tested by Granger causality test. Causality 
test gives results that among the variables involved did not give each 
other a causal relationship, so that the estimation can do. The 
Estimate using ordinary least square method, in which the model has 
met the classical test of autoregresive and heteroscedasticity. To 
view the sensitivity of the variables that affect consumption, we also 
analyzed the elasticity.  From the regression obtained the following 
results: 
 
 
Table 1: Effect of Traditional Threats (SNI)  on  Consumption 
                                                                                       (1990-2010) 
Parameter Coefficient St.Error Significant 
Constant 4233723 1192578 0,01 
Real GDP 0,6879** 0,063919 0,01 
SNI -4492497** 1300195 0,01 
Dummy -2,57796 172469,6 0,15 
R2 0,6354              
Prob F 0,000531         
DW 2,20                       
Note:  ** Statistically significant at 0:01 level 
The existence of a dummy variable is used to distinguish the 
behavior of the defense budget model, when the transition period the 
defense budget and the separation of police budget in Indonesia 
(2000-2004). 
 
Multiplier Effect Elasticity (10) Elasticity (5) 
dcons/dgdp =0,770444 E (10) = 1,1536 E (5) = 1,1765 
dcons/dsni =-4412220 E(10)=-2,3297 E (5) =-2,0964 
E (10) an average elasticity of the last ten years (2001 to 2010); E (5) 
an average elasticity last five years (2006 to 2010).  
Source: Results of Data Processing. 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
In testing the model, we found that the rate of traditional threats 
affect consumption significantly. Increased threat level will reduce 
consumption, and vice versa. This illustrates that needs to be 
eliminate traditional threats to influence the national consumption 
increasingly. The traditional threats must be offset by an increase in 
the defense budget. The transmission that affect the social welfare, 
especially consumption, is through defense programs in to eliminate 
the traditional threats. Thus, all economic actors can perform their 
economic activities optimally. 
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